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I . INTRODUCTION
Under international law, there is no single legal body with the power to generate
norms that are binding on all subjects without their consent.1 There is no cen-
tralized executive authority entrusted with implementation, while international
adjudicating bodies have no compulsory or comprehensive jurisdiction. Apart
from the absence of a centralized law-making and law-enforcement authority,
most publicists insist that with the exception of jus cogens,2 there is no a priori
hierarchy of sources under international law.3 This state of play is of particular
relevance when one assesses the role of international adjudicating bodies as they
settle disputes between states.4 International case law, like the writings of pub-
licists, is not a formal source of international law but, rather, provides ‘evidence’
of the applicable norms in the circumstances.5 Decisions of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international adjudicating bodies are binding
only upon the parties to the dispute.6 Nevertheless, by taking as an example the
conservation of living marine resources beyond national jurisdiction, this article
attempts to demonstrate that the contribution made by the ICJ and other inter-
national tribunals to the development of international law may be more signifi-
cant, especially when one considers the scenario referred to earlier.
This article will examine various judgments of the ICJ and other international
tribunals and assess their role and relevance in the development of the interna-
tional regulation of living marine resources occurring beyond national jurisdic-
tion. The way states interpret the freedom of access over living resources on the
1 I Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, at 1 (7th edition, 2008).
2 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 8 ILM 679 (1969), Articles 53 and 64 [VCLT]. See
also MN Shaw, International Law, at 123–24 (6th edition, 2008).
3 See Brownlie, supra note 1 at 5; see also J Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International:
How WTO Relates to Other Rules of International Law, Cambridge Studies in International and
Comparative Law, at 94 et seq (2003).
4 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) may also be requested by the organs and duly authorized
bodies or agencies of the United Nations to give an advisory opinion on the position of international
law relating to a matter of international concern.
5 Statute of the ICJ, Article 38(d) and Article 59.
6 Ibid, Article 59.
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high seas determines the manner in which they exercise regulatory and enforce-
ment jurisdiction over them as well as the kind of conservation measures states
obligate their nationals to take when fishing in marine areas beyond national
jurisdiction.7 Bodies adjudicating international disputes over the exploitation of
living marine resources have considered various legal issues in this field of
international law, the following being among the most common. First, states
tend to disagree on how they interpret the legal implications of freedom of
fishing and the obligation to take conservation measures as a qualification to
it. The article will examine those fisheries cases that have discussed to what
extent the flag state’s freedom of access over living marine resources on the high
seas is subject to the rights, duties, and interests of coastal states and of other flag
state participants in the same fishery.
Second, another contentious legal issue relates to the interpretation of the
exclusive enforcement jurisdiction of the flag state and to whether international
law allows other states any right to act against states that either fail to adopt
conservation measures on the high seas or that choose less stringent ones than
those agreed upon via international co-operation agreements. This legal question
revolves around the abuse of the flag state’s exclusive enforcement jurisdiction
on the high seas. It affects both coastal states that have painstakingly developed
a conservation plan for their exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or their exclusive
fishing zone (EFZ) as well as states that are participants in the same high seas
fishery and that have negotiated conservation measures via a co-operation agree-
ment. In the first case, the coastal state expects flag states to exercise compatible
conservation measures when their nationals fish on the high seas, and, in the
second case, flag states, whose nationals are participating in a fishery, find it
particularly frustrating and counter productive when another flag state who is not
a party to the conservation agreement reached via co-operation takes no action
against its fishing vessels that violate the conservation measures established in
the agreement or else adopt inferior ones.
Third, another question that often arises in international fisheries disputes
relates to the legal status of living marine resources occurring beyond national
jurisdiction and whether international law obligates all states to ensure the con-
servation of living marine resources on the high seas whether they are harvest-
able or not. The debate surrounding the legal status of these resources also
questions whether the obligation to take conservation measures on the high
seas is vested in the international community at large as an erga omnes obliga-
tion. The cohort of rules regulating the conservation of marine living resources
on the high seas has developed on an ad hoc basis, as a reaction to the historical
and political developments that have occurred throughout the centuries.8 As it
has become more and more specialized, this branch of international law has
7 Brownlie, supra note 1 at 252–53.
8 For a brief historical account on the development of the law of the sea, see ibid at 224–25.
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suffered from fragmentation,9 which has led to ambiguity and uncertainty when
states have sought to interpret and apply applicable norms. The decisions of
international adjudicating bodies provide the judges with an opportunity to iden-
tify what is the position of international law from the myriad of norms that have
accumulated over time. This article will attempt to examine various international
cases that have discussed the position of international law in fisheries disputes.
Occasionally, it will also refer to some other landmark cases that have treated an
entirely different subject matter whenever the legal arguments made by the
judges therein may elucidate the interpretation of applicable international
norms relating to the legal questions listed earlier.
I I . INTERNATIONAL CASE LAW ON RIGHT OF ACCESS OVER LIVING MARINE
RESOURCES ON THE HIGH SEAS AND THE QUALIFICATIONS TO THE
FREEDOM OF FISHING
1. The Freedom of Fishing and Reasonable Use to Ensure Access to the Same
Resources by Other States
In 1893, an international dispute arose between the United States and the United
Kingdom over the rights of jurisdiction of the United States in the Behring’s Sea
and the preservation of fur seals. The United States wanted to prohibit sealing
beyond its territorial waters by British flagged vessels because the seal colony
was based in its own territory. In the Behring Sea (Fur Seals) Arbitration Award,
the arbitrators not only reaffirmed the principle of freedom of fishing beyond
national jurisdiction but also recognized the need for restraint and called upon
both states to co-operate in regulating the seals’ over-exploitation on the high
seas.10 The Behring Sea case supported the interpretation that the freedom to fish
was not absolute but had to take ‘reasonable account of the interests of other
States.’11 The arbitrators considered that conservation measures were necessary
to ensure that the other participants’ rights of access to the same resources on the
high seas were not prejudiced. So by the end of the nineteenth century, the
Behring Sea case had already chastised abuse of the right of freedom of fishing
and referred to the interest that other stakeholders have over such resources. The
award ruled against the legality of any unilateral measures that hinder the free-
dom of access by other states to living resources on the high seas. The Behring
Sea case identified co-operation as the means permitted by international law to
ensure the conservation of the species so as to prevent over-exploitation that
9 Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Fragmentation of International Law:
Difficulties Arising from Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study
Group of the International Law Commission (2006) [Diversification and Expansion].
10 Behring Sea (Fur Seals) Arbitration Award (1898), 1 Moore’s International Arbitration Awards
755, [1974] ICJ Rep 3, reprinted in (1999) 1 International Environmental Law Reports 43.
11 Ibid at para 43.
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may lead to their extinction. It proposed a conservation plan for the parties and
even for other states involved in the exploitation of the fur seals.
The decision reached by the arbitrators in the Behring Sea case not only
provided evidence as to what were (and to some extent still are) the applicable
international norms but also served to influence the trend in international fish-
eries law for many years to the extent that its line of reasoning was included in
the 1958 Convention on the High Seas.12 This convention established that states
shall exercise the freedoms13 with ‘reasonable regard to the interests of States in
their exercise of the freedoms of the high seas.’ The 1958 Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas (High Seas Fishing
Convention) did not only refer to the interests of states whose nationals fish on
the high seas but also reiterated the right of freedom of fishing subject to coastal
states’ rights.14 In the 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (United Kingdom v
Iceland and Germany v Iceland), the ICJ was asked to decide upon the legality
of Iceland’s extension of its fisheries jurisdiction and the rights of the United
Kingdom and Germany as flag states whose nationals fish in the area.15 The
relevance of the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases in this discussion revolves around
the qualifications to the freedom of fishing due to the relative nature of the rights
of other states involved in a fishery on the high seas. The ICJ upheld as cus-
tomary international law Germany’s and the United Kingdom’s right to exercise
freedom of fishing. It declared that the parties’ respective rights, both as high
seas fishing states and as coastal states, were not absolute but ‘had to take full
account of each other’s rights and of any fishery conservation measures.’16
The decision of the ICJ in the 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction cases also referred
to the rights of access to living resources on the high seas but emphasized the
obligation of reasonable use, the need of conservation, equitable allocation, and
good faith between the parties when entering into negotiations. This approach
reflects the views of the ICJ in another case, namely the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases (Germany v Netherlands and Germany v Denmark), where it had
stated that negotiations must be meaningful and each side must listen to and take
into account each others’ interests.17 In the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, the ICJ
12 Convention on the High Seas, 450 UNTS 11.
13 Ibid, Article 2, which establishes that ‘[f]reedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions
laid down by these articles and by other rules of International law and comprises inter alia both for
coastal and non coastal States . . . the freedom of fishing.’
14 Article 1 of the 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, 559 UNTS 285 [High Seas Fishing Convention], establishes that ‘[a]ll States have the right for
their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas, subject (a) to their treaty obligations, (b) to the
interests and rights of coastal States as proceed for in this Convention, (c) to the provisions contained in
the following Articles concerning conservation of the living resources of the high seas.’
15 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v Iceland), [1974] ICJ Rep 3; Fisheries Jurisdiction
Case (Germany v Iceland), [1973] ICJ Rep 3 [Fisheries Jurisdiction cases].
16 Ibid at para 64.
17 North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Germany v Netherlands), (Germany v Denmark), [1969] ICJ
Rep 3 at 46–47, paras 83–85.
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also held that under the law of high seas fisheries, interested parties had a legal
obligation to negotiate an equitable solution.18 The ICJ’s decision relying on
Article 2 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas also informed the parties to
the dispute to pay due regard to the interests of other states in the conservation
and equitable exploitation of high seas fishing resources.
These decisions of international adjudicating bodies have served as precursors
to the negotiations that eventually led to Part VII of the 1982 UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which refers to the legal regime of the high seas
and, hence, the exercise of the freedoms within the context of this balance of
rights, duties, and interests between states.19 In turn, the negotiators of UNCLOS
eventually opted for the term ‘due regard’ to the interests of other states when
qualifying high seas freedoms, an expression regularly referred to in interna-
tional law as a manifestation of the obligation of good neighbourliness and the
reasonable use of common resources.20 Various jurists opine that when it comes
to the exercise of freedom of fishing, the application of ‘reasonable use’ means
use that would not compromise other states’ enjoyment of the same freedom.21
Their reasoning is consonant with Hugo Grotius’s Mare Liberum work, wherein
he identifies two main principles as the underlying basis for high seas freedoms:
first, that the high seas are accessible to all and cannot be appropriated by any
state and, second, that use of the sea and its resources by one state would leave
the same available for use by another.22 Gilbert Gidel interprets these principles
as both sides of the same coin: ‘Dirige´e contre l’exclusivite´ d’usage elle se
re´sout ne´cessairement en une ide´e d’e´galite´ d’usage.’23
There seems to be consensus on this line of interpretation,24 but it is still
considered difficult to put into practice what constitutes ‘reasonable use,’ ‘non
abuse of rights,’ and ‘equitable utilzation of resources.’25 Unless a state is a
18 Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, supra note 15 at para 64.
19 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21 ILM 1261 (1982) [UNCLOS].
20 E Hey, The Regime for the Exploitation of Transboundary Marine Fishery Resources, at 34–35
(1989). See also P Birnie, A Boyle, and C Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, at 201
(3rd edition, 2009).
21 R Bierzaneek, La Nature Juridique de La Haute Mer 2 RGDIP 245 (1895). See also MS
McDougal and WT Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans, at 761–62 (1975). See also RJ Dupuys
and D Vignes, A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea, volume 1, at 395 (1991). See also Birnie,
Boyle, and Redgwell, supra note 20 at 201 and 204; Brownlie, supra note 1 at 225.
22 Hugo Grotius, Mare Liberum (1609), Chapter V. The book was republished and edited with an
introductory note by James Brown Scott (1916).
23 Quoted in Brownlie, supra note 1 at 225.
24 F Orrego Vicuna, The Changing International Law of High Seas Fisheries, at 14 (1999); Birnie,
Boyle, and Redgwell, supra note 20 at 201 and 204.
25 See Orrego Vicuna, supra note 24, who says that it is difficult to put these principles of customary
international law into practice, but it is wrong to assume that customary international law prosees for
unrestricted freedom of fishing. See also Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, supra note 20 at 495, who argue
that the tribunal in the Behring Sea case clearly recognized that the freedom of fishing was not absolute
but had to be regulated to take reasonable account of the interests of other states, but they consider
reasonableness as a basis that allows states to argue that its abuse affects their interests in a negative
manner (at 201). The authors hold that the notion of reasonable use does not in itself serve as an
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party to an international agreement or considers that certain specific conserva-
tion measures are legally binding, the threshold beyond which the exercise of the
freedom of fishing is deemed ‘unreasonable’ remains at the discretion of the
high seas fishing state.26 In sum, it can be said that the international case law
referred to earlier has served to provide sufficient evidence, which demonstrates
that, although under international law the principle of freedom of fishing cannot
be derogated from, it is a qualified right and does not entail uncontrolled or
depredatory fishing activities.27 Nevertheless, international case law has not
shed much light on the substantive content of these qualifications. Both the
Behring Sea case as well as the Fishing Jurisdiction cases have highlighted
the modus operandi that is allowed under international law for the parties to
devise the substantive norms that would ultimately serve to achieve this balance
of rights. Intrinsically, this should ensure that all states have access to living
marine resources beyond national jurisdiction and the obligation to take the
necessary measures for their conservation. In proposing this particular method-
ology to achieve these goals, the decisions of international adjudicating bodies
have stressed the use of multilateral and regional co-operation instead of
unilateralism.
2. The Freedom of Fishing and the Rights, Duties, and Interests of Coastal States
The years following the Fishing Jurisdiction cases and the period when
UNCLOS was being negotiated were characterized by the ever-increasing
number of states that sought to extend coastal state jurisdiction as a measure
to counter the rampant abuse of the freedom of fishing. The predominant trend
was to extend coastal state maritime jurisdiction and encroach upon marine areas
previously falling under the high seas regime, rather than concluding effective
multilateral and regional fisheries agreements. A number of international dis-
putes, namely the Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of
24 February 1982 in the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v
Libya),28 the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine
Area (Canada v United States of America),29 and the Continental Shelf Case
(Libya v Malta),30 confirmed that the EEZ had become a rule of customary
international law, a trend that has led to crucial and unprecedented legal devel-
opments under the international law of the sea, which has greatly influenced the
alternative rule of substantive law requiring sustainable use of resources. Similarly, the authors con-
sider abuse of rights as setting the limits when states formulate certain international rights and obli-
gations and that applying the doctrine outside this remit leads to instability and relativity in the
application of international norms (at 205).
26 Dupuys and Vignes, supra note 21 at 399.
27 See Orrego Vicuna, supra note 24 at 22.
28 Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case
Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v Libya), [1985] ICJ Rep 18.
29 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v United States of
America), [1984] ICJ Rep 245.
30 Continental Shelf Case (Libya v Malta), [1982] ICJ Rep 12.
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relationship between coastal states and flag states whose nationals fish in those
areas of the high seas adjacent to the EEZ.
Acquiescence by states to EEZ claims, or sometimes claims for an EFZ, has
caused, under this new international regime, vast marine areas previously open
to freedom of fishing to suddenly become part of the exclusive jurisdiction of
coastal states—states that once had sovereign rights to exploit such species and
the responsibility to ensure their conservation. The Fisheries Jurisdiction cases
referred to the preferential rights of coastal states, which affected the balance
between the rights of coastal states and flag states when the latter were fishing on
the high seas. The EEZ regime gave coastal states ‘sovereign rights’ over living
marine resources occurring therein.31 Furthermore, the negotiations that led to
the conclusion of UNCLOS took into account the rights, duties, and interests of
coastal states with an adjacent EEZ or EFZ when drafting the provisions reg-
ulating the freedom of fishing on the high seas. This fundamental legal devel-
opment that was limitedly applied in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases found itself
as Article 116(b) in Part VII of UNCLOS. Part VII also entrenched the obliga-
tion on all flag states to co-operate as stakeholders in taking necessary conser-
vation measures when fishing in the same areas of the high seas and for identical
species. However, the establishment of the EEZ did not halt over-exploitation. In
fact, the precarious state of the fisheries, and of the marine environment in
general, continued to worsen years after many coastal states had made such a
claim. The situation served to generate further disputes between states with an
interest in the same fisheries. As explained earlier, although UNCLOS and the
relevant case law had provided clear evidence that states had to co-operate to
reach an agreement on how to adopt necessary conservation measures, the treaty
did not establish any minimum standards that could apply until co-operation
agreements were concluded. Neither did it establish a common denominator so
as to determine what these ‘necessary’ conservation measures should include.
These shortcomings indicate why the most disputed provisions of UNCLOS,
apart from the controversies surrounding its common heritage regime, were
those relating to the conservation of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory
species (HMS). States held disparate views as to how these provisions should be
applied and implemented, both in the marine areas subject to coastal state jur-
isdiction and beyond. This state of play led to some highly emotional disagree-
ments between states that threatened to upset the delicate balance of interests
between coastal and high seas fishing states established under the convention.
They also hampered the ultimate goal of ensuring adequate conservation for
straddling stocks and HMS. A fully fledged dispute was the Fisheries
Jurisdiction Case (Spain v Canada) (Estai case), which will mainly be dealt
with in the next part of this article as it mainly brought to the fore the difficulties
that hamper inspection and enforcement regimes on the high seas, even though
31 UNCLOS, supra note 19, Article 56(a).
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both Canada and Spain were parties to the same regional fisheries agreement,
namely the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO).32
Within the context of this part of the article, the decision in the Estai case
corroborates the views held by the judges in the Behring Sea case, whereby the
need to take conservation measures is not considered to constitute sufficient
grounds to deny other states the right to access living marine resources in the
adjacent areas of the high seas. The Estai case occurred in the same year that
the final act of the UN Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (Fish Stocks Agreement) was concluded and pre-
sented for signature.33 The Fish Stocks Agreement may be considered to be the
international community’s reaction to the difficulties exposed by state practice in
trying to rely on the UNCLOS regime that left too much discretion in the hands
of the stakeholders.
The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development had
already proposed in Agenda 21 the imminent need for a multilateral agreement
to promote the effective implementation of the applicable UNCLOS provisions
on straddling stocks and HMS.34 The Fish Stocks Agreement, which adopts
many of the sustainability objectives established under Chapter 17 of Agenda
21, seeks to establish specific rules to address the conservation of straddling
stocks and HMS on the high seas. It is termed to be an ‘implementation agree-
ment,’ which is meant to supplement the UNCLOS legal framework by introdu-
cing new conservation concepts such as sustainable use,35 the precautionary
approach,36 a broadened application of an ecosystem approach,37 compatibility
between EEZ and high seas conservation measures,38 and placing additional
weight upon the duty to co-operate.39 It provides the conservation measures
that need to be taken if high seas fishing states and coastal states fail to reach
an agreement,40 as required by UNCLOS in order to regulate the management
and conservation of such stocks.41 The Fish Stocks Agreement also amplifies the
conservation and management regime of UNCLOS42 as well as the other
32 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v Canada), [1998] ICJ Rep 432 [Estai case].
33 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 34 ILM 1547 (1995) [Fish Stocks Agreement].
34 Agenda 21 was adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio
de Janeiro, 1992, <http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf>.
35 Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 33, Article 2.
36 Ibid, Article 5(c) and 6.
37 Ibid, Article 5(e), (f), (g) and also Article 8.
38 Ibid, Articles 5, 7, 8.
39 Ibid, Article 3(2) and Article 5.
40 Ibid, Part III.
41 UNCLOS, supra note 19, Article 63(2), 64(1).
42 Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 33, Article 7(2).
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regional fisheries agreements addressing straddling stocks and HMS.43 It estab-
lishes the specific conservation duties of the flag states on the high seas44 as well
as monitoring obligations to be taken by state parties as participants in a high
seas fishery45 and as port states.46 All of these aspects will be further discussed
in the next section of this article.
3. Concluding Overview
The selection of international jugdments referred to earlier influenced the for-
mulation of new international norms as they identified evolving state practice in
this field of international law. The case law under examination demonstrates that
states consider their right of access over living resources on the high seas, as
well as the non-appropriation of such resources by any state, as a general prin-
ciple of international law—one of the high seas freedoms, more commonly
known as the freedom of fishing.47 The adjudicators in the Behring Sea case,
the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, and the Estai case acknowledge that this free-
dom encompasses the right vested in the state, which allows fishing vessels
registered under its flag to exploit living resources occurring beyond national
jurisdiction. Other states cannot hinder it from exercising the freedom of fishing,
but, in turn, the high seas fishing state has the concomitant duty not to restrict
access to these same resources by other states.
Case law has also served to identify major developments in the interpretation
of the application of freedom of fishing. The ‘original’ interpretation of a state’s
freedom of fishing as proposed by Grotius is based on arguments that date back
to the time when the sustainability of stocks was not an issue of international
concern.48 Over the centuries, as exploitation led to the scarcity of resources,
some states pressed for the need to take conservation measures when fishing on
the high seas—an obligation that, as explained earlier, was recognized as a
concomitant duty to the freedom of fishing by the judges in the Behring Sea
case. The 1958 Convention on the High Seas and Convention on Fish
Conservation and Management on the High Seas reiterated the predominance
of the freedom of fishing, but the judges in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases,
while affirming the freedom of access to high seas living resources, also accen-
tuated the need to take conservation measures to safeguard the coastal state’s
interests over the same.
43 Some of the measures proposed by the Fish Stocks Agreement are based on those identified by
UNCLOS and the fisheries agreements, but it also introduces new parameters that the 1982 UNCLOS
merely refers to. For a detailed discussion on this topic, see S Borg, Conservation on the High Seas,
Harmonizing International Regimes for the Sustainable Use of Living Resources, at 130–40 (2012).
44 Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 33, Article 18.
45 Ibid, Article 20(6).
46 Ibid, Article 23.
47 See Brownlie, supra note 1 at 225, who quotes Gilbert Gidel, International Law Commission
Yearbook, volume 2 at 68 and 252 (1950).
48 Grotius, supra note 22, Chapter V at 32 where Grotius says, ‘the same principle which applies to
navigation applies to fishing, namely it remains free and open to all.’
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The Fisheries Jurisdiction cases are considered to have greatly influenced the
negotiations of UNCLOS, as this convention obligates states to exercise the free-
doms with due regard to the rights of other states in their exercise of the same.49
It also establishes that states must ensure that their nationals take conservation
measures when exercising the right of freedom of fishing on the high seas.50
These UNCLOS provisions are said to codify customary international law. They
promote the exercise of the high seas’ freedoms in a manner that ensures orderly
access to such resources by others as well as the sustainability of stocks.51
UNCLOS clearly emphasizes what judges in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases
reiterated, namely that:
(a) The freedom of fishing as a norm of international law cannot be considered
in isolation but should be applied in accordance with other basic interna-
tional rules.
(b) The obligation to act with reasonable regard and to refrain from abuse of
rights towards others who share the same rights. UNCLOS for instance
refers mainly to the duty of flag states to cooperate with coastal states
whose EEZ is adjacent52 to the high seas where exploitation takes place,
and/or with other flag states that participate in the same high seas fishery.53
After the conclusion of UNCLOS in 1982, new international disputes high-
lighted the difficulties that ensued following the discretion that this convention
allowed in the interpretation of the earlier provisions. The Estai case exposed the
need to ensure compatibility of conservation measures between all states that
participate in the exploitation of straddling stocks and HMS on the high seas and
in the adjacent EEZ. The Fish Stocks Agreement, which entered into force a
couple of years later,54 attempted to address the major contentious issues that
characterize these disagreements between states. The Fish Stocks Agreement
seeks to overcome the problem of non-adherence with existing regional and
subregional fisheries agreements55 by establishing that its parties are to
49 UNCLOS, supra note 19, Article 87(2).
50 Ibid, Article 117.
51 For a brief historical account of the development of the law of the sea, see Brownlie, supra note 1
at 224–25; see also Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, supra note 20 at 706.
52 UNCLOS, supra note 19, Articles 116–20, Part VII, s 2 and the cross reference made in Article
116(b) to Articles 63(2) and 64–7.
53 Ibid, Article 118.
54 The Fish Stocks Agreement entered into force on 11 December 2001—that is, thirty days after the
date of deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification or accession, in accordance with Article 40(1)
of the agreement. TheEstai decision was delivered by the ICJ in 1998. Negotiations leading to the Final
Act of the Fish Stocks Agreement were concluded in 1995.
55 Examples include the 1950 Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission; the 1969 International
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas; the 1979 North Atlantic Fisheries Organization;
the 1982 Commission for the Conservation of Antartic Marine Living Resources; the 1994
Commission on the Conservation of the Southern Blue Fin Tuna; the 1995 Convention for the
Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea, <http://www.afsc.
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comply with the conservation measures listed therein when fishing in high seas
areas that fall under these agreements’ jurisdictional scope.56 The Fish Stocks
Agreement subsumes the conservation obligations in the regional and sub-
regional fisheries agreements,57 and so all of its parties are legally bound to
comply with them irrespective of whether they are parties or not to these agree-
ments.58 There has been widespread adherence to the Fish Stocks Agreement, so
compliance with the conservation measures laid down in regional and sub-
regional fisheries agreements would have established, at least among the Fish
Stocks Agreement parties, some uniformity and consistency when it comes to
identifying which conservation measures are the ones that may be ‘necessary’
and, therefore, which ‘flag states must ensure their nationals have to adopt when
fishing on the high seas.’59 Whether non-parties have acquiesced to this quali-
fication as a concomitant obligation to the freedom of fishing, however, remains
untested. Since the timing of the Estai decision and the conclusion of the Fish
Stocks Agreement coincided, the Estai case could not provide the opportunity
for the ICJ judges to verify whether the Fish Stocks Agreement provisions had
also been acquiesced to as norms of customary international law.
I I I . THE FLAG STATE’S EXCLUSIVE ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION ON THE
HIGH SEAS
1. Effectiveness of Flag State Jurisdiction and the ‘Genuine Link’
When Canada’s navy officers arrested the crew and seized the Estai on the high
seas in a NAFO regulatory area,60 the Spanish fishing vessel was allegedly
fishing for straddling fish stocks in contravention of internationally agreed con-
servation and management measures. Spain argued that the Canadian Coastal
Fisheries Protection Act (CFPA), on the basis of which the Canadian navy
officers acted, was in breach of international law because it extended
Canada’s jurisdiction to board and inspect vessels on the high seas.61 The
European Union (EU), which on behalf of Spain and its other member states
was involved in the exchange of letters throughout the dispute, reiterated that the
unilateral implementation of these provisions of the Canadian CFPA against the
noaa.gov/REFM/CBS/Docs/Convention%20on%20Conservation%20of%20Pollock%20in%20Centr
al%20Bering%20Sea.pdf>; and the 1996 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission.
56 Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 33, Article 8(3). For a map of the jurisdictional scope of the
regional and subregional fisheries agreements, see E Meltzer, The Quest for Sustainable Fisheries,
Regional Efforts to Implement the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, at 292–306 (2009).
57 Borg, supra note 43 at 37.
58 VCLT, supra note 2, Article 34 codifies a general principle of law, ‘a treaty does not create either
obligations or rights for a third state without its consent.’
59 UNCLOS, supra note 19, Article 117, which provides, ‘All states have the duty to take, or to
cooperate with other States in taking, such measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary
for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas.’
60 Meltzer, supra note 56 at 292 for a map of the NAFO regulatory area.
61 Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, RSC 1985, c C-33.
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Estai undermined the efforts of the international community to achieve effective
conservation through enhanced co-operation in the management of fisheries.
Furthermore, Spain and the EU emphasized how Canada’s actions on the high
seas constituted a serious breach of international law, which went far beyond the
question of fisheries conservation. Spain and the EU did not even attempt to
prove that the Estai was not actually infringing conservation measures within an
area of the high seas subject to NAFO and based their legal argument on the
inviolability of flag state jurisdiction in exercising enforcement measures on the
high seas. Spain and the EU insisted that a coastal state cannot board, inspect a
vessel, and arrest the crew without the flag state’s specific consent, as this con-
stitutes a serious breach of international law. It is unfortunate that the court had
to decline going into the merits of the case and ruled that it lacked the necessary
jurisdiction to take cognizance of it. It appears, however, as is evident from
Judge Oda’s intervention,62 that the coastal state’s need to take immediate action
to enforce conservation measures, even if these were agreed to via a co-oper-
ation agreement, can never justify it for hindering other states from accessing
living resources on the high seas.63
From a legal perspective, a positive outcome from the Estai case was the
eventual compromise agreement reached between Canada and the EU, including
Spain, on the implementation of conservation measures under NAFO. In a nut-
shell, this dispute saw, on the one hand, Canada amend its CFPA to renounce
taking such enforcement measures against vessels flying the flags of other states
without their consent, when the latter did not comply with conservation meas-
ures under the Canadian act. On the other hand, the EU member states had to
take effective control to ensure that their vessels complied with such conserva-
tion measures. The two sides pledged that once either of them broke these two
conditions such an agreement would be annulled. The Estai case demonstrated
the dire need for concerted action to ensure a compatible, if not a uniform,
approach towards the conservation of such species, wherever they occur. It
was scientifically proven that in the case of straddling stocks and HMS the
applicable international conservation regime must provide for co-ordination
among stakeholder states such that measures adopted in one zone would not
be undermined by the mismanagement of these species in another. This premise
62 He argued that the only issue in dispute, ‘was whether Canada violated the rule of international law
by claiming and exercising fisheries jurisdiction (namely, the prescribing of fishery regulations—
including the exclusion of fishing vessels flying the Spanish flag—the enforcement of those regulations
by Canadian government authorities and the imposition of penal sanctions on a Spanish vessel and its
master in an area of the high seas beyond the limit of its exclusive economic zone, or whether Canada
was justified in exercising fisheries jurisdiction in that area, on the ground of its honestly held belief that
the conservation of certain fish stocks was urgently required as a result of the fishery conservation crisis
in the Northwest Atlantic—irrespective of the NAFO Convention, which neither provides for the
unilateral adoption by coastal States of fishery regulations intended to apply in the Regulatory Area,
nor entrusts coastal States with the enforcement of such regulations in that area of the high seas.’
63 See final judgment of the Estai case, supra note 32 at 478, para 7 (separate opinion of Judge
Shigeru Oda). See also a discussion on this point by Borg, supra note 43 at 40–45.
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holds true for the appropriate conservation of all marine living resources, even if
for obvious political and commercial reasons it is even more urgent for the
international community to adopt such an approach when regulating the conser-
vation of harvestable stocks that transcend maritime areas.
Abuse of, or ineffective, exclusive flag state jurisdiction on the high seas
affects the conservation of living marine resources in two major ways. First,
flag states that refuse to adhere to a co-operation agreement establishing uniform
conservation measures that was adopted by other state participants in the same
fishery cannot be coerced to approximate their position unless such measures
have crystallized into customary international law. Consequently, a conservation
regime applicable on the high seas that was painstakingly negotiated by a group
of like-minded states may be jeopardized even if a minority, or indeed only one,
flag state adopts weaker conservation obligations. Second, this situation may
lead to flag hopping as owners of fishing vessels may choose to shop around and
register their vessel with those flag states that have adopted weaker conservation
measures. Furthermore, some flag states do not have the capacity or the political
will to exercise their enforcement jurisdiction effectively when their fishing
vessels conduct fishing operations on the high seas. The flag state has an obli-
gation to ensure its nationals take conservation measures when exercising the
freedom of fishing. Reference to nationals includes vessels registered under its
flag. This phenomenon has led to international disputes that query what are the
legal implications of the term ‘genuine link,’ which was a condition imposed by
UNCLOS that must exist between the vessel and the flag state.64
UNCLOS elaborates upon the duties of the flag state in Article 94. Since its
inception in the 1950s,65 the legal interpretation of the term ‘genuine link’ has
been riddled with controversy.66 During the negotiations of UNCLOS, the genu-
ine link was not discussed at great length,67 and the states’ perception of its legal
interpretation, at the time, reflected the advisory opinion of the ICJ in the
Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization.68 This advisory opinion, in turn, was
64 UNCLOS, supra note 19, Article 91.
65 Included as Article 5 of the 1958 United Nations Convention on the High Seas, supra note 12.
66 Brownlie, supra note 1 at 423; see also Judge Jennings remarks reprinted in 121 Hague Recueil
463 (1967) and International Law Commission’s views in International Law Commission’s Yearbook,
volume 2 at 278–79 (1956).
67 The paragraph in the Main Trends Working Paper during the UNCLOS negotiations had adopted
verbatim Article 5 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, supra note 12, and there were no proposals
for an alternative text.
68 The advisory opinion of the ICJ in Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-
Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, [1960] ICJ Rep 23, has contributed to the shifting
away from attempts to use the genuine link so as to limit reflagging of ships to open registries. It leans
towards the need to ensure a genuine link by calling for the adoption of more stringent international
norms for safety of ships and vessel-source pollution.
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based upon Article 5(1) of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas.69 There are,
in fact, two main schools of legal thought under maritime international law that
define the meaning of ‘genuine link.’ The restricted approach interprets the term
to require that its nationals are either the owners, or are part of the crew, of those
ships flying its flag.70 This approach has had limited success, mainly as a result
of opposition from the traditional maritime states and states with open regis-
tries.71 Another interpretation examines the genuine link within its broader con-
text, prescribing it for the sole purpose of safeguarding the necessary authority
of the flag state in the best possible manner.72 According to this approach, the
flag state’s capacity to exercise its authority is essential, otherwise the concept of
nationality of ships is futile and leads to anarchy on the high seas.73 This latter
interpretation embodies, in a better manner, the concomitant duties that the flag
states have with respect to ships flying their flag. Ultimately, it is the lack of
control over vessels flying their flag that leads to the flag states’ failure in
securing compliance and enforcement of their international obligations during
the exercise of their high seas freedoms.
The interpretation of a genuine link entailing effectiveness to secure compli-
ance is also present in legal instruments regulating fishing vessels on the high
seas where the debate on the meaning of ‘genuine link’ has also proved to be
controversial. This was all too evident during the negotiations that led to the
conclusion of the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) Agreement to
Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (Compliance Agreement).74
The Compliance Agreement did not adopt the wording of the Convention on
the Conditions for the Registration of Ships (Registration Convention) with
respect to the interpretation of the term.75 Neither did it include its qualification
69 ‘Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of
ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag
they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship; in particular, the
State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social
matters over ships flying its flag.’
70 Brownlie, supra note 1 at 423–25. See also H Meyers, The Nationality of Ships, at 225 (1967).
71 Brownlie, supra note 1; see also McDougal and Burke, supra note 21 at 1008–140.
72 Ibid. See also Brownlie, supra note 1 at 425–28, n 20.
73 For a general discussion on the subject, see Meyers, supra note 70.
74 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures
by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, <http://sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts-menu.html> [Compliance
Agreement]. It was concluded on 24 November 1993 and thus was negotiated later than the Convention
on the Conditions for the Registration of Ships, Doc. TD/RS/CONF/19/Add.1 (7 February 1986)
[Registration Convention]. A provision on the genuine link was originally included in a draft, but it
was deleted when it became clear that its inclusion would jeopardize the timely finalization of the
whole agreement.
75 The Registration Convention, supra note 74, which was negotiated between 1984 and 1986,
attempted to elaborate the genuine link concept even further. The FAO Compliance Agreement,
supra note 74, had attempted to address the act of reflagging. A draft of the agreement provided
that Parties to it should refuse to register fishing vessels unless ‘they had sufficient grounds to believe
that the vessel would not be used to undermine the effectiveness of internationally agreed conservation
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as to what the level of national participation in ownership should be in order to
ascertain this ‘genuine link.’ In this sense, unlike the Registration Convention,
the FAO’s Compliance Agreement has remained in line with UNCLOS’s pro-
vision on the ‘genuine link,’ which neither refers to national participation nor
does it distinguish between vessels used for fishing and other forms of shipping
vessels. Therefore, despite the Registration Convention, the main trend is to
interpret the term ‘genuine link’ as the flag state’s capacity to control and ex-
ercise jurisdiction on the high seas, without going into the issue of ‘sufficient
national participation.’ It appears that state practice favours this approach from
the way international tribunals have addressed the issue.
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) examined the imposition
of nationality requirements as an essential condition to guarantee a ‘genuine
link’ in Anklagemyndigheden v Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp Case.76 The
court addressed the question whether member states of the European
Community (EC) can maintain nationality requirements in respect of the regis-
tration of ships, as this would in turn discriminate against the freedom of move-
ment of citizens of other member states. EU member states alleged that the
imposition of such nationality requirements is an important instrument to
ensure the existence of a ‘genuine link’ between the state and the ship. This
case examined whether a vessel registered in a non-member country of the EC
may be treated, for the purpose of Article 6(1)(b) of EEC Regulation 3094/86
Laying Down Certain Technical Measures for the Conservation of Fishery
Resources, as a vessel with the nationality of a member state on the grounds
that there is a ‘genuine link’ between it and the member state.77 The vessel
concerned was owned and manned by Danish nationals and effectively operated
from Denmark and had previously been registered in Denmark. In the
Anklagemyndigheden case, the CJEU examined the ‘genuine link’ concept in
the context of the legal order of the EC and also under international law. The
CJEU held that, under international law,78 a vessel in principle has only one
nationality, that of the state in which it is registered.
and management measures.’ In addition, the original draft agreement contained a provision on the
Allocation of the Flag (Article IV) on the genuine link which read: ‘1. No Party shall accord any fishing
vessel to which the Agreement applies the right to fly its flag unless it is satisfied, in accordance with its
own national legislation, that there exists a genuine link between the vessel and the Party concerned. 2
(a) in determining whether or not there exists a genuine link for the purposes of paragraph 1, each Party
shall give due weight to all relevant factors, including in particular:(i) the nationality or the permanent
residence of the beneficial owner or owners of the vessel in accordance with their national law; (ii)
where the effective control over activities of the vessel is exercised.’ Despite the latitude of discretion,
which this draft article left to the decision of the parties, it still managed to be considered too restricted
and controversial and was left out from the final text.
76 Anklagemyndigheden v Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp Case, C-286/90 [1992] ECR I-06019.
77 EEC Regulation 3094/86 Laying Down Certain Technical Measures for the Conservation of
Fishery Resources, [1986] OJ L288.
78 It referred to Convention on the High Seas, supra note 12, Articles 5 and 6 and UNCLOS, supra
note 19, Articles 91 and 92.
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In its decision, the CJEU found that, under international law, EU member
states are not obliged to implement the ‘genuine link’ concept by imposing
nationality requirements. It also found that a member state may not treat a
vessel that is already registered in a non-member country, and therefore has
the nationality of that country, as a vessel flying the flag of that member state.
The fact that the sole link between a vessel and the flag state is the administra-
tive formality of registration cannot prevent the application of that rule. The
court held that it was for the state that conferred its nationality in the first place
to determine, at its absolute discretion, the conditions on which it would grant its
nationality.79
2. Strengthening the Role of Flag States and Options to Overcome Abuse
In the M/V Saiga Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea), the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) found that the absence
of a genuine link does not give another state additional possibilities to take
measures against a ship violating international norms and standards.80 The M/
V Saiga was an oil tanker flying the flag of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. It
served as a bunkering vessel supplying fuel oil to fishing vessels and other
vessels operating off the coast of Guinea. On 27 October 1997, the M/V Saiga
crossed the maritime boundary between Guinea and Guinea Bissau and entered
Guinea’s EEZ where, on the 28 October 1997, it was arrested by Guinean cus-
toms patrol boats, taken into Conakry, Guinea, where the vessel and its crew
were detained. No bond or other financial security was requested by Guinean
authorities for the release of the vessel and its crew. Neither did Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines offer to pay a bond. Instead, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, as the flag state, instituted proceedings with ITLOS under Article
292 of UNCLOS.
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines argued that the tribunal should determine
that the vessel, her cargo, and crew be released immediately without requiring
that any bond be provided. It was prepared to provide any security reasonably
imposed by the tribunal. Guinea, as the respondent state, requested the tribunal
to dismiss the applicant’s action. One of the claims made by the respondent state
was an objection to admissibility on the grounds that there was no genuine link
between the M/V Saiga and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Guinea claimed
that without
79 The court held that it follows from these considerations that the answer to the question must be that
a vessel registered in a non-member country may not be treated, for the purpose of Article 6(1) (b) of
EEC Regulation 3094/86, supra note 77, as a vessel with the nationality of a member state on the
ground that it has a genuine link with that member state.
80 M/V Saiga Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea) (Application for Provisional
Measures), ITLOS Case 2 (1997) 37 ILM 360 (1998) [M/V Saiga case]. See also B Kwiatkowska,
Inauguration of the ITLOS Jurisprudence: The Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea M/V Saiga
Cases 30(1) ODIL 43 (1999).
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a genuine link between Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and the M/V ‘Saiga,’ the
claim concerning a violation of its right of navigation and the status of the ship is not
admissible before the Tribunal vis-a`-vis Guinea, because Guinea is not bound to rec-
ognize the Vincentian nationality of the M/V ‘Saiga,’ which forms a prerequisite for the
mentioned claim in international law.81
Guinea further argued that a state cannot fulfil its obligations as a flag state under
UNCLOS with regard to a ship unless it exercises prescriptive and enforcement
jurisdiction over the owner or the operator of the ship. Guinea insisted that there
was no such relationship between the applicant and the said owner or operator of
the M/V Saiga and, therefore, that there was no ‘genuine link’ between the ship
and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Consequently, it argued that it was not
obliged to recognize the claims of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in relation
to the M/V Saiga. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines strongly rebutted this claim
of inadmissability. The tribunal addressed it on two fronts. It held that Article
91, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS provides that there must exist a genuine link
between the state and the ship. The judges in this ITLOS decision held:
Two questions need to be addressed in this connection. The first is whether the absence
of a genuine link between a flag State and a ship entitles another State to refuse to
recognize the nationality of the ship. The second question is whether or not a genuine
link existed between the Saiga and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines at the time of the
incident.82
The ITLOS judges went into the relationship of the 1958 Convention on the
High Seas and the 1982 UNCLOS regarding the definition of the term ‘genuine
link.’ They held that UNCLOS follows the approach of the 1958 convention, and
the former’s Article 91 retains the part of the third sentence of Article 5, para-
graph 1, of the 1958 convention, which provides that there must be a genuine
link between the state and the ship. The other part of this sentence, stating that
the ‘flag State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in adminis-
trative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag,’ is reintroduced in
Article 94 of UNCLOS as an instrinsic part of the duties of the flag state. The
ITLOS decision established that, while the obligation regarding a ‘genuine link’
was maintained in the 1982 convention, the proposal that the existence of a
‘genuine link’ should be a basis for the recognition of nationality was not
adopted.83
The ITLOS decision referred to the procedure to be followed where another
state has ‘clear grounds to believe that proper jurisdiction and control with
respect to a ship have not been exercised.’84 This state is entitled to report the
facts to the flag state, which is then obliged to ‘investigate the matter and, if
81 M/V Saiga case, supra note 80 at para 75.
82 Ibid at para 79.
83 Ibid at para 81.
84 Ibid at para 6
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appropriate, take any action necessary to remedy the situation.’ Furthermore, the
tribunal’s judges observed that nothing in Article 94 of UNCLOS permits a state
that discovers evidence indicating the absence of proper jurisdiction and control
by a flag state over a ship to refuse to recognize the right of the ship to fly the
flag of the flag state.85 The conclusion of the judges sitting on the tribunal is that
the purpose of the provisions of the convention on the need for a ‘genuine link’
between a ship and its flag state is to secure more effective implementation of
the duties of the flag state and not to establish benchmarks against which the
validity of the registration of ships in a flag state may be challenged by other
states.
The ITLOS judges to this case, also referred to the Fish Stocks Agreement and
the Compliance Agreement, which were not yet in force at the time. The judges
held that even these agreements, ‘set out, inter alia, detailed obligations to be
discharged by the flag States of fishing vessels but do not deal with the condi-
tions to be satisfied for the registration of fishing vessels.’86 The tribunal there-
fore rejected the objection for inadmissibility, first, because there is no legal
basis for Guinea’s claim to refuse to recognize the right of the M/V Saiga to fly
the flag of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. According to Guinea, there was no
‘genuine link’ between the ship. Second, the tribunal found that, in any case, the
evidence provided by Guinea does not justify its contention that there was no
‘genuine link’ between the ship and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines at the time
when the case happened.87 Therefore, the option of enhancing jurisdiction and
control over fishing vessels by other interested parties can only apply when the
flag state specifically consents to such an intervention by third parties.
The Estai case served to highlight the difficulties under international law
relating to enforcement jurisdiction on the high seas, which is vested exclusively
in the flag state. Presently, states that intervene upon non-party fishing vessels on
the high seas without the flag state’s consent, are considered to be in breach of
international law for violating the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state, even if
they may be conducting illegal fishing operations. It is the flag state that has
exclusive enforcement jurisdiction over its own fishing vessels on the high seas.
Any exceptions to this rule may be exercised if specifically prescribed by trea-
ties.88 In this context, boarding and inspection to check for compliance with
conservation rules, if established by a treaty, are only applicable against state
parties, and, as reiterated in the Estai case, the flag state’s prior consent is still
required in such cases.
85 Ibid at para 82
86 Ibid at para 85
87 Ibid at paras 87 and 88
88 Under international maritime law, one finds piracy jure gentium as an exception to the rule of
exclusivity of flag state jurisdiction on the high seas in the sense that any state may assume jurisdiction
over a vessel that carries out piractic acts on the high seas. This norm of customary international law is
codified under UNCLOS, supra note 19, Article 105.
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3. Concluding Overview
The abuse of exclusive jurisdiction by flag states on the high seas is often linked
to flags of convenience that remain a major hurdle for ensuring compliance with,
and the enforcement of, conservation obligations in maritime areas falling out-
side national jurisdiction. The current position under international law as it
emerges from the Anklagemyndigheden case and the M/V Saiga case demon-
strates that the lack of presence and control of the flag state over its vessels does
not give the right to the coastal state to assume enforcement jurisdiction without
the consent of the flag state. Inevitably, this situation does not facilitate the
position of other states to curb flag state abuse. Various sources of international
law referred to in the case law quoted earlier, tend to accept that the flag state’s
genuine link with the vessel manifests itself in its obligation to ensure effective
jurisdiction and control over its vessels in order to secure compliance with
conservation measures on the high seas. This is, after all, the real crunch
issue since it is the absence of such control that leads to non-compliance and
poor enforcement. The inability or inertia on the part of the flag state to secure
compliance with, and enforcement of, international norms applicable on the high
seas, stultifies regional co-operation on the conservation and management of
marine living resources. Admittedly, national participation in ownership is an
advantage for securing compliance, but it does not necessarily mean that to
improve enforcement and eliminate illegal fishing the international community
should rely upon nationality as a guarantee for better enforcement. States there-
fore have steered away from a more restrictive definition of the term ‘genuine
link,’ particularly by avoiding the association of ownership with nationality
requirements.
Following the position adopted by the case law referred to earlier, the Fish
Stocks Agreement and various regional agreements proposed other measures to
secure compliance with, and implementation of, international conservation re-
gimes.89 They have done so mainly by elaborating in substantive terms the
responsibilities of the flag state.90 Mandatory measures such as the granting of
licenses or authorization to fish have been included in treaty provisions of the
regional fisheries agreements.91 Some have established a procedure that renders
the flag state accountable to the regional fisheries organization and interested
state parties.92 The flag state is required to explain and defend its position with
89 See Borg, supra note 43 at 237–43, for a discussion on how the Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note
33, the Compliance Agreement, supra note 74, and regional fisheries management organizations have
introduced limited jurisdiction to the ‘inspecting state’ and the port state that can intervene immedi-
ately and that may act in the absence of any measures that flag states should take but do not do so.
90 Compliance Agreement, supra note 74, Article III; Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 33, Article
18.
91 For a thorough overview of the regional and subregional fisheries agreements measures in this
respect, see Borg, supra note 43 at 219–24; Meltzer, supra note 56 at 269–91.
92 Borg, supra note 43 at 226–34, for a detailed account of such procedures used by the different
fisheries organizations and agreements.
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respect to enforcement measures taken against vessels flying their flag that have
been in breach of conservation measures. In this manner, the international case
law quoted earlier has served to guide states to devise legal mechanisms that
guarantee the effective exercise of jurisdiction and control over fishing vessels
instead of entering into the controversy raised by the ‘genuine link’ concept.
This approach is not only a safer alternative, politically speaking, but also allows
for more legal and practical flexibility.
Compliance measures can be varied to address the very different exigencies
posed by fishing on the high seas. More importantly, widespread adherence to
the Fish Stocks Agreement encourages port states to adopt strict sanctions on
vessels with fish landings that have not been harvested on the high seas accord-
ing to the convention’s conservation regime.93 Similarly, coastal states (with the
flag state’s consent) may be allowed to exercise their enforcement powers upon
foreign flag vessels.94 This would not only assist or supplement compliance by
the flag state but may also help to discourage reflagging since fewer states would
be in a position to offer a less rigorous conservation regime than the one
imposed by the Fish Stocks Agreement.95 Even flag states that are reluctant to
authorize port and coastal states to exercise controls over vessels flying their flag
would at least be legally bound to act.96 At any rate, once the vessel voluntarily
enters port it would be subject to the port state’s regulations. It is only with
respect to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction against the owners and the master
of the vessel that the port state would remain dependant on the flag state’s
consent.97
States can always apply the active nationality principle98 to counter reflag-
ging, a measure also recommended in the FAO’s International Plan of Action on
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU).99 This international
law principle enables states to exercise criminal jurisdiction over nationals wher-
ever they fish, even if their fishing vessel is registered in another state. It must be
acknowledged that even if states enact national legislation that inflicts criminal
93 International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Safety Management Code, IMO
Resolution A.741(18), as amended by Docs MSC.104(73), MSC.179(79), MSC.195(80) and
MSC.273(85), <http://www.imo.org/OurWork/HumanElement/safetymanagement/pages/ismcode.
aspx>. The success of regional co-operation in controlling and enforcing maritime conventions
under the Paris Memorandum of Port State Control has led to the adoption of this approach for
other regions in recent years. The Paris Memorandum itself has been amended several times to enhance
its effectiveness.
94 See Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 19 ILM 841 (1980),
Article V; Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, Article 26. For a detailed discussion, see
Borg, supra note 43 at 237–42.
95 Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 33, Article 19(1)(e).
96 Ibid, Article 23.
97 Brownlie, supra note 1 at 318–19.
98 Ibid at 303–4.
99 International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, in Responsibilities of
All States, at 6; the IPOA refers to controls over nationals and national legislation providing for
enforcement in the case of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.
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punishment upon the owners and crew of ships that permit and use illegal fishing
gear, exploit protected species, or carry out any other illegal activity related to
fishing on the high seas, effective enforcement in such cases remains unlikely
due to this lack of ‘presence.’ Furthermore, the way states apply the active
nationality principle varies and is often limited in many ways. Few states
have a legal framework that bestows upon them jurisdiction over their nationals
under any circumstances, wherever these nationals would be.100 It is therefore
unlikely that this legal remedy would spur flag states that do not have the will or
the capacity to control their vessels to take action via the active nationality
principle.
IV. THE ECOSYSTEM APPROACH AND THE LEGAL STATUS OF LIVING MARINE
RESOURCES IN AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION
1. The Meaning of ‘Conservation’ of Living Marine Resources and Its Evolution
under International Law
Since the creation of UNCLOS, new conservation principles have evolved pro-
posing a wider scope to the obligation to take conservation measures on the high
seas that is not limited to safeguarding the balance of interests solely between
states directly involved in fisheries. The ecosytem approach qualifies the free-
dom of fishing even further, aiming at conserving marine biodiversity in its
entirety and the oceans as a single habitat for the benefit of all states in the
interest of both present and future generations. Similarly, the precautionary ap-
proach requires states to avoid risks and choose more selective harvesting meth-
ods and less intensive fishing efforts.101 Agreeing upon a legal definition of the
term ‘conservation’ and the scope of its applicability is one of the major chal-
lenges during the course of negotiating a fisheries treaty.102 In other words,
which benchmarks should the international community use to translate the ob-
ligation to take conservation measures into substantive legal provisions? Should
conservation measures be limited only to harvestable species or should they
100 This is in fact what the United States can do under the Lacey Act, which provides US enforcement
officials with authority to prosecute vessels and fishermen in the United States for violating any fishery
regulations of any state wherever the vessel is and wherever the offence was committed. See also
Riddle Kevin, IUU Fishing: Is International Cooperation Contagious? 37(3–4) ODIL 272 (2006).
101 See, for example, Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 33, Article 6(1), which establishes that the
precautionary approach that should be applied widely for the purpose of, ‘conservation, management
and exploitation of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in order to protect the living
marine resources and preserve the marine environment.’
102 C De Klemm, Living Resources of the Oceans, in DM Johnson, ed, The Environmental Law of the
Sea, IUCN Environmental Policy Paper no 18, 71 at 118 (1981), who remarks that it is ironic that
international law insisted on relying on the maximum sustainable yield despite the skepticism sur-
rounding the validity and accuracy of the concept for achieving a favourable conservation status. See
also WT Burke, The New International Law of Fisheries, UNCLOS and Beyond, at 45–55 (1994); Borg,
supra note 43 at 177–78.
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ensure the conservation of the entire ecosystem and habitat of the species subject
to exploitation?
The High Seas Fishing Convention provides one of the very few definitions of
the term ‘conservation’ as ‘an aggregate of measures rendering possible an
optimum sustainable yield so as to serve a maximum supply of local food and
other marine products.’103 This convention establishes that conservation pro-
grams should be formulated to secure food for human consumption and products
for their needs. The insistence on anthropocentric requirements as a basis for
conservation under the convention did not leave much room for interpreting the
term according to the ecocentric approach and for exploring the wider interest of
the international community in the same resources. A few years later, as the
1982 UNCLOS negotiations were still in full swing, the ICJ judges in the
Fisheries Jursidiction cases departed from the interpretation of the term ‘con-
servation’ as defined by the unsuccessful 1958 High Seas Fishing Convention.
After assessing other applicable fisheries conventions104 and state practice at the
time, the judges held that
it is one of the advances of maritime international law, resulting from the intensification
of fishing, that the former laissez-faire treatment of living resources of the high seas has
been replaced by a recognition of a duty to have due regard to the rights of other States
and the needs of conservation for the benefit of all.105
According to the ICJ’s decision, the definition of conservation provided in the
High Seas Fishing Convention seems to have evolved to include the flag state’s
duty as an obligation intended for the benefit of all states and not only to safe-
guard the preferential rights of coastal states adjacent to the high seas and other
flag state participants to a fishery.106 These views of the ICJ in the Fisheries
Jurisdiction cases were, as already discussed earlier,107 to some extent later
reflected in UNCLOS’s definition of freedom of fishing and the obligation to
exercise the freedoms with due regard to the interests of other states.108 Another
relevant measure includes Article 119(b), which provides that when taking con-
servation measures during fishing operations on the high seas, flag states shall
‘take into consideration the effects on species associated with or dependent upon
harvested species.’ The drafters of UNCLOS chose not to define conservation
and sought to qualify the freedom of fishing by imposing an obligation upon all
states exercising such a right to take the necessary conservation measures when
their nationals exploit living marine resources on the high seas.109 States are
103 High Seas Fishing Convention, supra note 14, Article 2.
104 See list in note 55 in this article.
105 Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, supra note 15 at para 64.
106 See also Orrego Vicuna, supra note 24 at 10; Oda Shigeru, International Control of Sea Resources,
at xxvi (1989).
107 See discussion earlier in this article
108 UNCLOS, supra note 19, Article 87(2).
109 Ibid, Article 117.
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required to do so not only in the case of harvestable species but also for related
and dependant living marine resources.110 The convention’s provisions, how-
ever, do not enter into the specifics, and so a myriad of other international
agreements, drawn up in different fora, establish various norms that seek to
translate into substantive terms the major legal developments referred to earlier,
while balancing out the diverse interests of the various states and the ecological
requirements of marine species and their habitat.
These agreements can be divided into three main categories: fisheries agree-
ments,111 multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs),112 and regional seas
programs,113 which in most cases have a legal component that includes a con-
vention and various protocols issued thereunder. More than 143 countries par-
ticipate in thirteen regional seas programs established under the auspices of the
UN Environment Programme in major maritime regions.114 The Fish Stocks
Agreement was the first serious attempt to approximate the ultimate goals and
objectives of the international fisheries regimes with those of MEAs and other
sources of international environmental law. The Fish Stocks Agreement and the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) also influenced other regional and
subregional fisheries agreements and regional seas programs to revise their con-
stituent treaties and incorporate more holistic conservation goals.115 These
trends, which favour an ecosystem approach, highlight the international com-
munity’s awareness of the intrinsic value of all living marine resources and their
habitat.116
110 Ibid, Article 119.
111 The 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW); the 1950 Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission; the 1969 International Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas; the 1979 North Atlantic Fisheries Organization; the 1982 Commission for the
Conservation of Antartic Marine Living Resources; the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, supra
note 74; the 1994 Commission on the Conservation of the Southern Blue Fin Tuna; the 1995
Convention for the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central Behring
Sea; the 1996 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission; the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 33; the
1997 General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean; the 2003 Convention on the Conservation
and Management of Fishery Resources in the South East Atlantic Ocean; and the 2004 Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.
112 The following are major multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) that also address the
conservation of living marine resources. The earliest examples include the 1973 Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna, 12 ILM 1088 (1973) [CITES],
and the 1979 Convention on the Migratory Species of Wild Animals, 19 ILM 15 (1980) [CMS]. More
recent MEAs include the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 ILM 818 (1992) [CBD]; the
1995 Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Programme, [1999] OJ L132.
113 The Regional Seas Programme was launched in 1974. Ecosystems and biodiversity are a key issue
addressed by these programs. See <http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/issues/default.asp>.
114 The regions covered are: the Black Sea, Wider Caribbean, East Asian Seas, Eastern Africa, South
Asian Seas, ROPME Sea Area, which involves the Arabian Gulf States, Mediterranean, North-East
Pacific, Northwest Pacific, Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, South-East Pacific, Pacific, and Western Africa.
There are also five partner programs for the Antarctic, Arctic, Baltic Sea, Caspian Sea, and north-east
Atlantic regions.
115 Meltzer, supra note 56, for matrices; Borg, supra note 43 at 182–87. CBD, supra note 112.
116 Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, supra note 20 at 128–32.
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Apart from favouring, albeit rather cautiously, an ecosystem approach, gen-
eral state practice has clearly supported the need for formulating special con-
servation measures for particular marine species such as straddling stocks,
sedentary species, and marine mammals. While the Behring Sea case has sub-
jected seals (marine mammals) to the same regime as other living marine re-
sources ever since the mid-twentieth century, the trend is to distinguish between
marine mammals and other harvestable marine living resources.
2. Conservation as an Obligation Erga Omnes
The ecosystem approach implies that all marine biodiversity has an intrinsic
value per se. This line of reasoning may also imply the right of any state to make
a claim against another that has failed to take ‘necessary conservation measures
on the high seas.’ These arguments also serve to highlight a link between the
resources vested in humanity as a whole and erga omnes obligations under
international law. In Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Belgium
v Spain), the ICJ distinguished between two different types of obligations that
states may have, namely contractual obligations that arise vis-a´-vis only those
states with whom they may have concluded an agreement and erga omnes ob-
ligations whose binding effect is collective and owed to the international com-
munity as a whole.117 The issue of erga omnes obligations in an environmental
context was raised in the 1974 Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v France and New
Zealand v France) when Australia and New Zealand complained that nuclear
experiments by France in marine areas beyond national jurisdiction constituted
an interference with the high seas’ freedoms of all states.118 In this case, the ICJ
did not accept that Australia and New Zealand had the required legal standing to
bring forward such a claim against France and so dismissed the applicability of
the erga omnes obligation in this context.
Recent developments brought about by the evolution of international envir-
onmental law may have led the international adjudicating body to adopt a dif-
ferent stand today. For instance, the CBD in its preamble has classified
biological diversity as a common concern of humankind.119 By ‘affirming that
the conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of humankind,’ the
parties to the CBD consider biodiversity, including living marine resources, as a
common resource whose vulnerability requires a concerted effort from all states
to ensure its conservation for present and future generations.120 So far the
‘common concern concept’ is included only in UN resolutions and preambular
117 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Belgium v Spain, [1970] ICJ Rep 3.
118 Nuclear Tests (Australia v France) (Jurisdiction), [1974] ICJ Rep 253; Nuclear Tests (New
Zealand v France) (Jurisdiction), [1974] ICJ Rep 457.
119 CBD, supra note 112 at preamble para 3.
120 FL Kirgis Jr, Standing to Challenge Human Endeavours That Could Change the Climate 84 AJIL
525 (1990). See also Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, supra note 20 at 128–32; Alan Boyle, International
Law and Protection of the Global Atmosphere: Concepts, Categories and Principles, in RR Churchill
and D Freestone, eds, International Law and Global Climate Change, 7 (1991).
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paragraphs in treaties,121 but it may serve to strengthen the legal standing of a
state to make a claim against another state that has failed to adopt conservation
measures to safeguard a common resource, even if it is not directly affected as a
coastal state or as a participant in the same high seas fishery. In their Draft
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, the
members of the International Law Commission (ILC) have included the possi-
bility of legal standing by states, other than the injured state, when the obligation
breached is, ‘owed to a group of states, including that state and is established for
the protection of the collective interest of the group’122 and/or ‘if the obligation
breached is owed to humanity as a whole.’123 In their commentary to these
articles, the ILC refers to ‘the environment’ as an example of the first type of
obligation and protection from marine pollution as an example of the second.124
It is useful to examine any legal implications the notion of common concern
may have upon future decisions of the ICJ or other international adjudicating
bodies, bearing in mind the commentaries made by the ILC and the recognition
by the state parties to the CBD regarding the precarious state of natural resources
such as biological diversity.125 By declaring in the preamble of the CBD that
biodiversity is a common concern of humankind, the parties acknowledge the
limitations of regulating such resources only on the basis of jurisdictional zones.
The CBD refers to the jurisdictional scope of the treaty and includes ‘processes
and activities, regardless of where their effects occur, carried out under the
jurisdiction or control of contracting Parties, within the area of its national
jurisdiction or beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.’126 The CBD is not
subjecting living resources on the high seas to global management as UNCLOS
does with the mineral resources of the deep seabed under Part XI. The parties, by
affirming biological diversity as a common concern of humankind in view of the
jurisdictional scope of the same treaty, as identified in Article 4(b), imply that
because of their particular nature and importance, components of biodiversity
121 The concept was originally put forward in UNGA Resolution 43/53 on Climate Change, was then
incorporated in the preambular paragraphs of both the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, 31 ILM 849 (1992) [UNFCCC], and the CBD, supra note 112.
122 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with
Commentaries, reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-
Third Session (2001), Article 48(1)(a), 126 et seq.
123 Ibid, Article 48(1)(b).
124 Ibid, commentaries to Article 48(1)(b) at 127.
125 The concept was first proposed by Malta under UNGA Resolution 43/53 as the first paragraph of
this resolution that may be considered as the genesis of the UNFCCC, supra note 121. The legal
implications of the phrase reported here were explained in the second committee by David Attard, chief
legal adviser to the Malta delegation at the time. The same phrase was later adopted to define the status
of biological diversity under the CBD, supra note 112.
126 CBD, supra note note 112, Article 4(a) and (b).The provisions of the CBD apply in relation to each
contracting party: ‘(a) In the case of components of biological diversity, in areas within the limits of its
national jurisdiction; to the contracting Parties with respect to the components of biodiversity. In para 4
of the preamble and article 3 of the CBD the host State has sovereign rights over such biodiversity
located within those areas subject to its jurisdiction.’
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(including those occurring on the high seas) are of vital interest to humankind
and constitute a global unity. Any threats to their conservation status may affect
the whole community of states or humanity as a whole.
The possibility that the conservation of high seas living resources may be
considered by states as an erga omnes obligation may also be inferred from
Judge Christopher Weermantry’s dissenting opinion in Gabcˇı´kovo-Nagymaros
Project (Hungary/Slovakia), which was given after the conclusion of the
CBD.127 This case was the first international dispute of a purely environmental
nature that the ICJ had to decide upon. Judge Weeramantry referred to sustain-
able development as an erga omnes obligation.128 Given the assimilation that
conservation has assumed with sustainable development and sustainable use,129
and compared to the maximum sustainable yield levels prescribed by the ap-
plicable provisions of UNCLOS,130 this dissenting opinion has strengthened the
arguments made earlier regarding the apparent trend to subject resources of
global significance to the international community’s legitimate interest to safe-
guard them and impose upon all states a common responsibility to ensure their
sustainable use. More recently in Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v
Uruguay), the ICJ was asked to settle a dispute between Argentina and Uruguay
after Uruguay unilaterally decided to build two pulp mills on the river that serves
as a border between the two states.131 The Pulp Mills case involved transbound-
ary pollution and not over-exploitation as a form of environmental degradation.
It also related to a shared, rather than a common, resource such as the high seas.
The ICJ decision in the Pulp Mills case, however, may shed further light on
the validity of the arguments made earlier and on the possible line of thinking
that an international tribunal may take if it has to decide a dispute involving the
legal standing of any state to challenge another state’s over-exploitation of living
resources on the high seas.132 Relying on the advisory opinion it had given in
1996 in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ’s judgment in
the Pulp Mills case held: ‘A State is thus obliged to use all the means at its
disposal in order to avoid activities which take place in its territory, or in any
area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the environment of
127 Gabcˇı´kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), [1997] ICJ Rep 7.
128 Ibid. See also Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, supra note 20 at 131, n 153, who argue that the
assumption that sustainable development is a legal obligation may be incorrect. Brownlie, supra
note 1 at 278, refers to sustainable development as an ‘emergent principle of international law.’
129 See also Borg, supra note 43 at 175–79.
130 UNCLOS, supra note 19, Article 119.
131 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Provisional Measures), [2006] ICJ Rep
113.
132 D Tladi, Principles of Sustainable Development in the Case Concerning the Pulp Mills on the
River Uruguay, Legal Working Paper for the International Development Law Organization (2002),
<http://www.idlo.int/Documents/Rio/01.%20Pulp%20Mills%20on%20the%20River%20Uruguay.
pdf>. See also A Boyle, Pulp Mills Case: A Commentary, <http://www.biicl.org/files/5167_pulp_
mills_case.pdf>.
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another State.’133 The judgment went on to say that this obligation ‘is now part
of the corpus of international law relating to the environment.’
An international case that could have specifically determined whether under
international law a state can bring forward an international claim regarding the
over-exploitation of a common resource, without the applicant having to prove a
direct interest, was Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan).134 Australia
instituted legal proceedings against Japan before the ICJ, where it alleged that
Japan had breached, and is continuing to breach, the obligation under paragraph
10(e) of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling’s schedule
to observe the zero catch limit in relation to the killing of whales for commercial
purposes.135 It also alleged a breach by the respondent of its obligation under
paragraph 7(b) to act in good faith and refrain from undertaking commercial
whaling of humpback and fin whales in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary. Japan, as
the respondent, claimed that it was not breaching the moratorium but, rather,
availing itself of whaling conducted under Article VIII, commonly referred to as
‘special permit’ or ‘scientific’ whaling.136 Australia rebutted these claims and
additionally asserted that Japan, by carrying out its research whaling program in
the Southern Ocean, referred to as the JARPA II program, had breached its
obligations under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) with respect to the proposed take
of humpback whales.137 Australia also argued that Japan was in breach of the
CBD where, as a party, it is required to ensure that activities under its jurisdic-
tion and control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Australia requested the ICJ to order
Japan to cease the implementation of the JARPA II program, to revoke any
authorizations, permits, or licenses, and provide assurances that it would guar-
antee that any further action under JARPA II or similar programs be brought into
conformity with international law. Eventually during the course of the proceed-
ings, Japan decided to stop its JARPA II program in the Southern Ocean, and so
the case has been closed. We will never know whether the ICJ would have
133 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, [1996] ICJ Rep 242, para 29.
134 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan), [2010] ICJ Rep 400. See article by DR Rothwell,
Australia v. Japan: JARPA II Whaling Case before the International Court of Justice, in Proceedings
Instituted by Australia against Japan: Application Instituting Proceedings (31 May 2010). See also
Reuben B Ackerman, Japanese Whaling in the Pacific Ocean: Defiance of International Whaling
Norms in the Name of ‘Scientific Research,’ Culture, and Tradition 25 BC Int’l & Comp L Rev 323
(2002); E Merron, The Regulation of International Whaling: Will Australia v. Japan Mark a Turning
Point? Mich J Envt’l & Administrative L (4 December 2012), <http://students.law.umich.edu/mjeal/
2012/12/the-regulation-of-international-whaling-will-australia-v-japan-mark-a-turning-point>.
135 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 161 UNTS 72 [ICRW].
136 Ibid, Article VIII, provides that ‘any Contracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a
special permit authorizing that national to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific re-
search . . . and the killing, taking and treating of whales in accordance with the provisions of this Article
shall be exempt from the operation of this Convention.’
137 CITES, supra note 112.
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accepted Australia’s legal standing to institute such proceedings on behalf of the
international community as a whole.
3. Concluding Overview
The increase in public awareness on the precarious state of living resources on
the high seas has nurtured a strong political will to consider the oceans as a
holistic ecosystem where all species and their habitat have to be safeguarded
from anthropogenic interference and mismanagement. Consequently, towards
the end of the twentieth century, the objective of applicable norms became
more focused on ensuring the conservation of living marine resources via
their sustainable use, wherever they occur and irrespective of whether they
are harvestable or not. Freedom of fishing remains a prima facie right vested
in all states, and, as reiterated earlier, the exclusive rights of coastal states in
their economic or fishing zones are acquiesced to as a norm of customary inter-
national law. Both of these rights were enshrined in UNCLOS.
The more recent trends in legal thinking, particularly in light of the ILC’s
draft articles, suggest that while a common resource cannot be appropriated
global responsibilities towards it may become erga omnes in character, owed
to the international community as a whole. Under these circumstances, any state
would have the legal standing to make an international claim against another, for
lack of compliance with an erga omnes obligation under international law. To
date, apart from the dissenting opinion of Judge Weermantry who refers to
sustainable development as an erga omnes obligation in the Gabcˇı´kovo-
Nagymaros case, the ICJ has not applied the concept of erga omnes obligations
outside human rights or humanitarian law. The CBD’s substantive obligations,
which establish that states shall ensure that any activities falling under their
authority in areas beyond national jurisdiction must comply with the provisions
of the same convention, tend to pave the way forward for further developments,
according to this trend in the line of legal thinking.138
V. THE ROLE OF ADJUDICATING BODIES FOR THE HARMONIZATION OF
APPLICABLE NORMS
1. Harmonization of Successive and Specialized Norms
One of the major challenges international adjudicating bodies face when resol-
ving disputes between states is the fragmented nature of international law. The
report of the ILC’s study group, entitled Diversification and Expansion of Inter-
national Law: Difficulties Arising from Diversification and Expansion of Inter-
national Law, refers to the harmonization of norms as a legal technique to
overcome fragmentation via the systematic integration of various sources of
international law that may be applied in the circumstances. The same report
138 Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, supra note 20 at 232–33.
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identifies applicable international norms regulating the conservation of marine
living resources on the high seas to be one of the primary examples of fragmen-
tation under international law.139 Both international fisheries agreements and
some MEAs140 have addressed the conservation of living resources on the
high seas, but, since they developed in parallel,141 the two streams of interna-
tional law have adopted different strategies, standards, and rules to regulate
these same goals. Fragmentation may give rise to normative conflicts when
two or more treaties or other sources regulate the same situation.142 For instance,
the 1958 High Seas Fishing Convention defines conservation and perceives it as
a measure to ensure food security. The Convention on the Migratory Species
of Wild Animals, whose scope of applicability also includes living marine
marine resources, provides a very detailed definition of conservation that goes
beyond the anthropocentric approach found in the 1958 High Seas Fishing
Convention.143 UNCLOS does not define conservation and establishes the obli-
gation to take conservation measures when states exercise the freedom of fishing
not only with respect to harvestable living resources but also for ‘associated or
dependent species.’144
More recent treaties such as the 1992 CBD and the 1995 Fish Stocks
Convention aim at the conservation of the species per se and have formulated
detailed obligations on how conservation measures should be implemented. The
CBD’s provisions lay down conservation obligations applicable to all forms of
biodiversity when state parties carry out operations under their jurisdiction on
the high seas,145 while the Fish Stocks Agreement’s jurisdictional scope is
focused on straddling stocks and HMS. These examples demonstrate that in
139 Diversification and Expansion, supra note 9, para 1-4.
140 For a list of fisheries agreements and MEAs, see notes 111 and 112 in this article respectively
141 See Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, supra note 20 at 744–52; Borg, supra note 43 at 14–16.
142 According to the wording of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, if there is an apparent or an actual
conflict between treaty and custom, the general trend is that the treaty provisions will prevail, whenever
both states involved in the dispute are parties to the same treaty. For a discussion on conflict of norms
under International law. See Pauwelyn, supra note 3.
143 CMS, supra note 112, Article 1(b), (c) and (d), which defines the conservation status of a migra-
tory species as ‘the sum of the influences acting on the migratory species that may affect its long-term
distribution and abundance.’ According to the convention, the ‘conservation status’ will be taken as
‘favourable’ when ‘(1) population dynamics data indicate that the migratory species is maintaining
itself on a long-term basis as a viable component of its ecosystems; (2) the range of the migratory
species is neither currently being reduced, nor is likely to be reduced, on a long-term basis; (3) there is,
and will be in the foreseeable future, sufficient habitat to maintain the population of the migratory
species on a long-term basis; and (4) the distribution and abundance of the migratory species approach
historic coverage and levels to the extent that potentially suitable ecosystems exist and to the extent
consistent with wise wildlife management; and (d) ‘Conservation status’ will be taken as ‘unfavour-
able’ if any of the conditions set out in sub-paragraph (c) of this paragraph is not met.’
144 UNCLOS, supra note 19, Article 119(1)(b).
145 CBD, supra note 112, Article 4: ‘The provisions of this Convention apply, in relation to each
Contracting Party: . . . (b) In the case of processes and activities, regardless of where their effects occur,
carried out under its jurisdiction or control, within the area of its national jurisdiction or beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction.’
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW72
the compendium of international norms that regulate the conservation of living
resources on the high seas, one finds examples of lex priori and lex posteriori as
well as lex generalis and lex specialis. This situation complicates the position of
users as they need to discern what their legal obligations are amid this plurality
of applicable norms. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT) is considered to be an authoritative source on the law of treaties,146
incorporating some general principles of law.147 It establishes that state parties
shall take into account ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties.’148 This quotation implies that there is a presump-
tion against conflict when the same set of facts may be regulated by more than
one treaty and that users must aim for the harmonization of applicable norms
when they interpret treaties accordingly.
In the case of lex priori and lex posteriori, Article 30 of the VCLT provides
that if ‘successive treaties relate to the same subject-matter’ a subsequent treaty
that specifies that it is subject to an earlier treaty and/or not in conflict with it
should be interpreted to mean that the provisions of the earlier treaty ‘shall
prevail.’ This provision explains why Article 311(1) of UNCLOS establishes
that it should prevail over the 1958 Convention on the High Sea and the 1958
High Seas Fishing Convention among state parties. If a treaty is not suspended,
although it has been replaced by another, it remains applicable vis-a`-vis those
states that are parties to it and that are also parties to the new treaty, insofar as it
does not conflict with the provisions of the latter. The provisions of the earlier
treaty would, however, still prevail if, in the case of a dispute where it is applied,
one of the states is a party to it but not to the new treaty. The use of certain
terminology in treaties such as ‘without prejudice to’ and ‘further to’ are often
utilized to overcome the potentially conflicting interpretation of subsequent
treaties vis-a`-vis the previous one. Article 22 of the CBD and Article 311 of
UNCLOS take this situation into consideration.149
Article 22(1) of the CBD specifically provides that ‘the provisions of the
Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of any contracting
Parties derived from any existing international agreements, except where the
exercise of those rights and obligations would cause serious damage or threat to
biological diversity.’ In the following subparagraph, the CBD establishes that
the contracting parties shall implement this convention (CBD) ‘with respect to
the marine environment consistently with the rights and obligations of states
under the law of the sea.’150 It appears that the CBD is making a special af-
firmation with respect to UNCLOS that does not apply to other treaties. In the
sense that the negotiators may have introduced this subparagraph to ensure that
146 Brownlie, supra note 1 at 608; VCLT, supra note 2.
147 Brownlie, supra note 1 at 608, especially n 6.
148 VCLT, supra note 2, Article 31(3)(c)
149 Borg, supra note 43 at 269.
150 CBD, supra note 112, Article 22(1)(2).
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if there is a threat to the marine environment or biodiversity the CBD provisions
would apply among state parties but without overriding the rights and obliga-
tions (including the freedom of fishing) under UNCLOS. Article 311(1) of
UNCLOS is open-ended and transfers the competence to decide what should
happen in case of a conflict with another treaty to whoever applies the law, as
long as it would not affect the rights and obligations under other treaties if these
are compatible ‘with this Convention and which do not affect the enjoyment by
other states Parties’ of their rights thereunder.151 There is an exception to this
provision, however—UNCLOS provisions would apply if there are agreements
that derogate from the basic principles relating to the common heritage of man-
kind under Article 136.
The relationship between UNCLOS and the CBD, as expressed in these two
provisions, is a method of streamlining and co-ordinating legal norms, which
states may use at the negotiating phase to facilitate harmonization between ap-
plicable treaties. These provisions, however, need to be applied cautiously both
by users as well as by adjudicating bodies of international disputes because no
treaty provision is cast in stone. States may always decide to conclude a new
international agreement, and a treaty may also be superseded by the crystalliza-
tion of a more recent rule of customary international law.
2. Harmonizing Fragmentation as a Result of Procedural Norms
In the case of lex specialis and the lex generalis, the VCLT also refers to other
procedural legal measures to ensure harmonization between applicable treaties,
such as determining the relationship between the general norms and the spec-
ialized ones. One can notice that the international legal sources that regulate the
conservation of living resources on the high seas range from norm-creating
treaties such as UNCLOS to subregional and bilateral agreements.
Additionally, some norms relate to particular species such as straddling
stocks, marine mammals, and anadromous species that raise issues of priority
and specialization as the lex specialis that supplements and fine tunes the lex
generalis. International adjudicating bodies are therefore bound to identify the
most adequate legal techniques to avoid, minimize, or mitigate the conflict of
applicable norms. Their contribution in facilitating the harmonization of frag-
mented sources of international law is portrayed by the Southern Bluefin Tuna
Cases (New Zealand v Japan and Australia v Japan),152 which among other
issues delved into the relationship between fisheries agreements, namely
UNCLOS and the regional Convention on the Conservation of the Southern
Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT).153 The parties to the dispute, namely Australia and
New Zealand, as applicants against Japan as the respondent, asked ITLOS to
151 UNCLOS, supra note 19, Article 311(2)(3).
152 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Australia and New Zealand v Japan), ITLOS Case 3 and 4, 39 ILM
1388 (2000) [Southern Bluefin Tuna case].
153 Convention on the Conservation of the Southern Bluefin Tuna, 1819 UNTS 360 [CCSBT].
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determine which would be the applicable provisions to settle the dispute. All
three states were parties to UNCLOS and to the CCSBT.
In a landmark decision, ITLOS concluded that the CCSBT provisions should
be applied as they supplement UNCLOS both as lex specialis and as lex pos-
terior. The tribunal held that international legal obligations benefit from a pro-
cess of accretion and accumulation.154 The adjudicating tribunal opted to
co-ordinate the interpretation of applicable legal instruments and to consider
them as mutually supportive. The Southern Blue Fin Tuna case demonstrates
how the ITLOS judges used legal techniques to resolve fragmentation between
framework and implementation treaties. It appears that this may happen more
readily when treaties have similar objectives or are directly related and are
negotiated specifically to supplement one another.
In the World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes United States – Measures
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products
(Tuna-Dolphin case)155 and United States – Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Shrimp-Turtle case),156 the WTO Appellate
Body had to decide a dispute regarding the prohibition under US law of placing
on the market fish products that were not harvested via the use of selective
fishing gear in the first case and certain fishing techniques in the latter case.
The United States refused to allow fish imports that were not caught by selective
fishing gear/methods, which were meant to avoid incidental catch of dolphins in
the case of tuna products and turtles in the case of shrimp. The applicant states
accused the United States of introducing non-tariff trade barriers in breach of
WTO rules. The tuna-dolphin and shrimp-turtle ‘wars’ exposed the inability of
the international community at the time to find a solution where the application
of environmental trade measures could, if the case was genuine, be used and not
necessarily classified as non-tariff trade barriers. In the WTO fisheries trade
disputes, the need to safeguard fisheries from over-exploitation was acknowl-
edged, but the use of trade sanctions by states was nontheless branded as a
breach of free trade rules. The WTO Appellate Body could not rely on inter-
pretation as a legal technique to achieve harmonization because the application
of one norm (trade sanctions) was in direct breach of another (the introduction of
non-tariff trade barriers).
154 Southern Bluefin Tuna case, supra note 152 at para 52; see also JA Roach, Dispute Settlement in
Specific Situations 7 Geo Int’l & Envt’l L Rev 775 (1995); C Romano, The Southern Bluefin Tuna
Dispute: Hints of a World to Come, Like it or Not 32(4) ODIL 313 (2001); T Stephens, The Limits of
International Adjudication in International Law: Another Perspective on the Southern Bluefin Tuna
Case 19(2) IJMC 177 (2004); Diversification and Expansion, supra note 9 at 21, para 29, for a dis-
cussion on the relationship between UNCLOS, supra note 19, and the CCSBT, supra note 153.
155 United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna
Products, WTO Doc DS21 (1991) at para 5.42 [Tuna-Dolphin case].
156 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS58/
AB/R (1998), 38 ILM 118 (1999) [Shrimp-Turtle case] (complaint by India Malaysia and Thailand
against US on prohibition of imports of shrimp and shrimp products).
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The WTO Appellate Body in the Shrimp-Turtle case, interpreted the WTO
term ‘exhaustible natural resources’ according to Article XX(g) of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).157 It found that the import ban on
shrimp and shrimp products as applied by the United States is inconsistent with
Article XI:1 of the 1994 GATT and cannot be justified under Article XX of the
1994 GATT. On 13 July 1998, the United States notified its intention to appeal
certain issues of law and legal interpretations developed by the panel. The
Appellate Body report was circulated to members on 12 October 1998. The
Appellate Body reversed the panel’s finding that the US measure at issue is
not within the scope of measures permitted under the chapeau of Article XX
of GATT but concluded that the US measure, while qualifying for provisional
justification under Article XX(g), failed to meet the requirements of the chapeau
of Article XX. It did take into consideration the provisions of other applicable
treaties, namely UNCLOS, the CBD, and CITES, among other sources, but still
ruled that conservation measures taken in accordance with these treaties con-
stituted a trade barrier in accordance with GATT rules.158
3. Concluding Overview
The different outcomes between the Southern Bluefin Tuna case and the WTO
trade disputes is best explained via the observation made by the ITLOS judges
in another case—the MOX Plant Case (Ireland v United Kingdom).159 The
ITLOS judges held that the application of the same rules by different fora and
institutions may vary due to ‘differences in respective context, object and pur-
pose as well as the subsequent practice of parties and travaux preparatoires.’160
One of the salient characteristics and major assets of international law is its
dynamism. International norms evolve over time and assume different functions:
some serve as a fallback, establishing basic rights and obligations; others specify
more detail, adding on to and fine-tuning earlier and more general norms. When
norms accumulate and interact, they may complement and supplement each
other, but, as discussed earlier, they may also in some cases appear to express
different or conflicting rights and obligations. Under these circumstances, the
role of international adjudicating bodies is to ensure that the application of the
157 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 55 UNTS 194.
158 Ibid. See <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm>. On 15 May
1998, the panel report was circulated to members.
159 MOX Plant Case (Ireland v United Kingdom), ITLOS Case 10, 126 ILM 273 at para 50 (2005).
The case related to a nuclear facility namely, the MOX Plant at Sellafield in the United Kingdom.
Ireland claimed it was causing negative effects on the environment as a result of its operations. The
dispute was subject to the multilateral and general rules of UNCLOS, the regional rules of the
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, 32 ILM 1069
(1993) [OSPAR Convention] (since the dispute related to pollution in the North Sea) and the appli-
cation of EU acquis communautaire as embodied in the EURATOM treaty (because both parties are
members of the EU). As a result, the dispute was raised at three different institutional procedures: under
ITLOS, under the compulsory dispute settlement procedure set up under the OSPAR Convention and
before the European Court of Justice because of the EC/EURATOM treaty.
160 Ibid.
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law safeguards its unity even as norms become more complex and specia-
lized.161 Although international tribunals in this respect stand to facilitate the
harmonization of applicable rules through the legal techniques referred to ear-
lier, as directed by the VCLT and other treaty provisions, they may be unable to
overcome conflicts that cannot be interpreted away. It appears that the most
challenging cases for international adjudicating bodies occur when more than
one specialized treaty is applicable, as was the case with the Dophin-Tuna162 and
Shrimp-Turtle163 WTO disputes.
The setting up of ITLOS and the other dispute settlement mechanisms in
treaties and regional fisheries management organizations is a reaction to the
ever-increasing developments under the law of the sea that have transformed
it into a specialized branch of international law. These achievements may thus
provide stronger and more responsive jurisprudence, but, in itself, this process
also risks causing the fragmentation of the international adjudicating system,
thus diminishing the ICJ’s central role as the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations. As we have seen in the WTO cases, it appears that, due to
their mandate, international tribunals set up under specialized treaties would
have greater difficulty than the ICJ to apply international norms emerging
from other sources that conflict with provisions and the spirit of the treaty
that constitutes them.
VI . CONCLUSION
This article has examined various landmark judgments that have influenced the
course of behaviour of states in regulating the conservation of living resources in
marine areas beyond national jurisdiction. As we have seen, international case
law may influence the development of international law particularly during the
negotiation of multilateral agreements. States and international organizations
have at times reacted to the decisions of international adjudicating bodies by
conducting bilateral, regional, and multilateral agreements to further develop the
law when international case law has exposed lacunae or the inadequacies of
international law in promoting conservation. These decisions have also shed
some light on the application of international law in general, particularly
when a plurality of sources is involved. It was pertinent to examine decisions
of international adjudicating bodies that have not dealt with living marine re-
sources on the high seas but that may have an impact on their international
161 See speech by His Excellency Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the ICJ to the Sixth
Committte of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), ‘The Proliferation of International
Judicial Bodies: The Outlook for the International Legal Order,’ delivered on 27 October 2000,
at 4, <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/SPEECHES/iSpeechPresident_Guillaume_Sixth
Committee.20001027.html>.
162 Tuna-Dolphin case, supra note 155.
163 Shrimp-Turtle case, supra note 156.
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regulation, particularly when these decisions relate to the responsibility of states
beyond national jurisdiction.
Apart from the interpretation of treaties, international case law often serves to
confirm or dismiss the arguments put forward by the parties to a dispute as to
whether a particular type of state practice is legally binding and may even affirm
general principles of law. As we have seen earlier, international adjudicating
bodies, relying upon various treaties as well as state practice, have recognized
the obligation on the part of any state, whose nationals fish on the high seas, to
take necessary conservation measures.164 They have also reiterated that the right
of access over the resources occurring therein are relative165 to those of other
states.166 At the same time, such bodies have turned down claims made by states
regarding their right to take unilateral conservation measures hindering other
states from accessing living resources on the high seas.167 More recently, even in
other cases that deal with international environmental law issues, the ICJ and
other international tribunals have examined the legal status of certain forms of
state practice, which, as stated earlier, are considered as emergent principles of
international law. As post-UNCLOS developments supplement its provisions in
stressing this concept of common responsibility towards the conservation of
marine living resources occurring on the high seas, international case law pro-
vides evidence that the regulation of the freedom of fishing has not evolved
within the context of collective undertakings and global management168 but,
rather, as a means to incorporate environmental concerns in a holistic manner.
This resume´ on international case law has therefore highlighted some of the
most salient developments underscored by international law in the regulation of
living marine resources beyond national jurisdiction. In sum, the exclusive jur-
isdiction of flag states over living marine resources has thus assumed different
meanings over the centuries: from an absolute freedom to one that has sought to
maintain a balance of interests between coastal states and flag states whose
nationals fish on the high seas. Originally and to a certain extent to this very
day, it is largely predominated by economic interests. However, more recently,
international law has incorporated conservation obligations that ensure the sus-
tainability of stocks over which both the participants in the fisheries and the
entire international community have an interest. Various legal arguments have
been made regarding the current state of play, and some issues remain
164 Orrego Vicuna, supra note 24 at 8–22.
165 Brownlie, supra note 1 at 299, who argues that, under international law, sufficiency of grounds for
jurisdiction is not merely a question of basic competence but is relative to the rights of other states. See
also Shaw, supra note 2 at 646–47.
166 Behring Sea case, supra note 10; Fisheries Jurisdiction cases (Merits), supra note 15 at 3 and 175.
167 Brownlie, supra note 1 at 252.
168 UN Doc A/AC.138/SC.1/SR. 17 (9 August 1971) where Lebanon, in its statement in the Seabed
Committee, had called for the collective organization of high seas fisheries and UN Doc A/AC.138/SC.
II/SR.30 (29 March 1972) where Mexico in its statement before the Seabed Committee had suggested
the establishment of an international authority for high seas fisheries.
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hypothetical as they have not yet been tried and tested but may indicate where
international environmental law may venture in the near or distant future. As Ian
Brownlie observes, international adjudicating bodies will undeniably continue to
play a pivotal role in this context even if one must be cautious, since Article 59
of the ICJ statute establishes in its proviso that ‘[t]he decision of the court has no
binding force except as between the Parties and in respect of that particular
case.’169 Judges sitting in international adjudicating bodies cannot ‘make’ the
law and must interpret and apply norms they consider as applicable in the cir-
cumstances.170 However, a great deal depends on their approach and attitude
when deciding international law cases. Indeed, progress is registered whenever
‘the rules of [maritime law] have been the product of mutual accomodation,
reasonableness and co-operation.’171 These words found in the judgment in the
Fisheries Jurisdiction cases remain as valid today as on the day they were
delivered.
169 Brownlie, supra note 1 at 21.
170 Ibid at 20.
171 Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, supra note 15 at para 53.
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